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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICTS-CONTRACTS-LAw OF PLACE OF BENEFICIAL OPERATION
AND EFFECT DETERMINING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT.
Graham v. Wilkins (Conn. 1958).
Defendant, a resident of Connecticut,' leased a truck to a Pennsylvania
corporation. She alleged that the contract was executed in Pennsylvania.
The truck was used by the corporation in Massachusetts, New York and
Connecticut, and garaged in Connecticut. Plaintiff sustained personal
injuries as a result of the operation of the truck in Massachusetts by an
employee of the Pennsylvania corporation. Plaintiff brought suit under
a Connecticut statute 2 which imposes on one who leases a motor vehicle
to another the same liability as that of its operator. Stating as the rule
of conflicts of laws that "a liability arising out of a contract depends upon
the law of the place of contract unless the contract is to be performed or
to have its beneficial operation and effect elsewhere" the court held such
operation and effect was in Connecticut so that Connecticut law applied and
imposed liability on the defendant. Graham v. Wilkins, 138 A.2d 705
(Conn. 1958).8
Most courts use a mechanical approach to the question of what law is to
govern a commercial contract which has a relation to two or more
jurisdictions.4 Under this approach the contract is broken down into
questions of nature and validity of the contract, which are generally gov-
erned by the law of the place of contract; 5 questions of the manner and
details of performance, which are governed by the law of the place of per-
formance; 6 and with various splinter questions having particular rules
such as capacity 7 and recission. s However, some courts follow a "center
1. The defendant alleged that she was domiciled in Rhode Island but the court
passed over this point.
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. §2479 (1949).
3. Graham v. Wilkins, 138 A.2d 705 (Conn. 1958).
4. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
5. Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878) ; Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155,
124 N.E.2d 99 (1954) (dictum); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1090 (1935);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934).
6. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1268 (1935); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS §358 (1934).
7. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1176 (1935).
8. Id. at 1275.
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of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory 9 by which "instead of re-
garding as conclusive the intention of the parties or the place of making,
or performance, [emphasis is laid] . . . upon the law of the place which
has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute." 10 Another
approach is to apply the law intended by the parties to control," whether
such intention is express 12 or implied. 13  To confuse matters further the
courts of a single jurisdiction have used at various times as many as four
different methods of determining which law is to govern the validity of a
contract.1
4
The leading case interpreting the Connecticut statute in question is
Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co.15 in which liability was
imposed upon the lessor-owner for a Massachusetts accident on the theory
that, at the instant of the execution of the contract in Connecticut, the
statute became a term of the contract. The thirty years of vigorous life of
the Levy decision seem to answer the query of whether the Connecticut
legislature intended to impose liability toward people struck in other
states through contracts executed in Connecticut by Connecticut residents.
At least, when the matter in issue was characterized as one of contract,' 6
the usual conflict of laws rule of applying the law of the place of con-
tract automatically produced such a result. The rule applied in the
instant case was developed in a line of Connecticut cases concerning mort-
gages and sales of property and was considered an exception to the general
rule of applying the law of the place of contract.17  These cases applied the
law of the situs of the property on the theory that since the alleged contract
was to have its beneficial operation and effect at this situs, the parties must
have intended such law to govern.' 8  Since the truck was to be operated
9. W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 586, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1945);
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954) and cases and authorities cited
therein.
10. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
11. Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance and Mutual
Life Assurance Soc'y, Ltd., [1938] A.C. 224, 230; Cook, 'Contracts' And The Con-
flict of Laws: 'Intention' Of The Parties, 32 ILL. L. Rv. 899 (1937-38).
12. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955). This case
stated that before a court would give effect to a chosen law the court would satisfy
itself that it was a bona fide choice and that it was the law of a jurisdiction having
some relation to the contract. These conditions are also stated as necessary in
Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R.I. 162, 174, 192 Atl. 158, 164
(1937).
13. Nussbaum, Conflict Theories Of Contracts: Cases Versus Restatement,
51 YALE L.J. 893, 895-97 (1941-42).
14. Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 467-68, 286 N.Y. Supp.
4, 6-7 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
15. 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 (1928).
16. Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 335-36, 143
Ati. 163, 164 (1928).
17. See, Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 83 F.2d 168, 171 (2d Cir.
1936).
18. In re Greene, 134 Fed. 137 (D. Conn. 1904); H. G. Craig & Co. v. Uncas
Paper Board Co., 104 Conn. 559, 133 Atl. 673 (1926); McLoughlin v. Shaw,
95 Conn. 102, 111 At. 62 (1920); Beggs v. Bartels, 73 Conn. 132, 46 Atl. 874
(1900); Chillingworth v. Eastern Tinware Co., 66 Conn. 306, 33 Atl. 1009 (1895).
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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
in Massachusetts and New York as well as Connecticut, the contract in the
instant case would also have a beneficial operation and effect in those states
and as effective an argument could be made for the application of the laws
of those jurisdictions.19 To consider that the parties in the instant case
intended Connecticut law to apply is an obvious fiction, the use of which
results in the extra-territorial application of Connecticut law to a Pennysl-
vania contract.2 0  It is doubtful whether the Connecticut legislature has
exhibited so strong a public policy as to warrant the courts disregarding
the usual conflict of laws rule and extending the Connecticut statute's reach
outside the state boundaries in this way.
Paul W. Callahan.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL ASSIMILATIVE CRIMES ACT OF
1948--VALID AS A CONTINUING ADOPTION OF
FUTURE STATE LAWS.
United States v. Sharpnack (U.S. 1958).
Defendant was indicted in a federal court for the commission of several
sex crimes while on an air force base in Texas. The acts involved are not
specifically made crimes under federal law,' but are covered by the Fed-
eral Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948.2 That act provides that within
certain federal enclaves, acts not punished by any enactment of Congress
are punishable as federal crimes under the laws of the state wherein the
enclave is located. The Texas Penal Code s which makes these acts a
crime, was enacted in 1950, two years after Congress passed the Federal
Assimilative Crimes Act. The district court dismissed the indictment "for
the reason that Congress may not legislatively assimilate and adopt crim-
inal statutes of a state subsequent to the enactment of the Federal Assimila-
tive Statute". On appeal, the Supreme Court reversing, with Justices
Black and Douglas dissenting, held that the Federal Assimilative Crimes
Act is constitutional as a deliberate continuing adoption by Congress for
federal enclaves of such offenses and punishments as shall have been
enacted by the respective states. United States v. Sharpnack, 78 Sup. Ct.
291 (1958). 4
19. Such an argument was made by the defendant but not accepted by the court.
20. See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1086 (1935).
1. There was no contention that the acts here charged were punishable under
any enactment of Congress other than by virtue of the Assimilative Crimes Act,
nor that Randolph Air Force Base is not a federal enclave subject to that act.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
3. TEX. PEN. CoDE ANN. § 535(b), (c) (1952).
4. United States v. Sharpnack, 78 Sup. Ct. 291 (1958). Although the Court
explicitly stated that, "Rather than being a delegation by Congress of its legisla-
tive authority to the states . . . [the Act is an] . . . adoption . . . [of State
laws] . . . ," they nevertheless went on to say, "This Court also has held that
[VOL. 3.
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The Constitution grants to Congress the ". . . Power to dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territories or
other property belonging to the United States." ' Except in those cases
where a state retains partial jurisdiction over its property upon cession,6
the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over all federal enclaves.-
Local laws respecting private rights, in existence at the time of the
cession of a federal enclave, continue in force, in the absence of con-
gressional action.8 State statutes enacted after cession do not become a
part of the body of law in the ceded area. 9 Congress alone is competent to
make laws for these areas. 10 Since the task of maintaining an adequate,
current criminal code which would be exhaustive and apply in all federal
enclaves throughout the country seems impractical, Congress has called on
the states for help. In certain cases they have worked out a system of
concurrent jurisdiction, thus allowing the state in cooperation with the
federal government to enforce the law in these areas." In other instances
they have "adopted" state laws as applicable to the enclave; this method
has been the basis for all of the federal assimilative crimes acts.' 2  Those
acts prior to the one in question, 18 adopted the laws of the state in exist-
Congress may delegate to local legislative bodies broad jurisdiction over territories
and ceded areas provided Congress retains, as it does here, ample power to revise,
alter and revoke the local legislation." The latter statement would seem to indicate
that the majority viewed this Act as an adoption of State law and at the same
time a lawful delegation of legislative authority-thus finding no inconsistency
in the two concepts. It is true that Congress has in certain instances (the District
of Columbia in particular) given a local legislature power to enact a system of laws
for the territory, Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 (1915), but in these
cases the people within the enclave elect those representatives and thus have a voice
in their laws. This delegation is analogous to the local option laws, an admitted
exception to the unlawful delegation doctrine. However, under the present Act
the alleged delegation is to the state legislature, a body which is not elected by the
people in the federal enclaves and concerning which they have no voice. There-
fore such cases would not appear to be controlling.
5. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. See U.S- CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 17.
6. Wilson v. Cox, 327 U.S. 474 (1946); James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula,
309 U.S. 431 (1940) ; James v. Dravo Construction Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1940).
7. The term "exclusive legislation" in Article one, section eight of the United
States Constitution has been interpreted to mean "exclusive jurisdiction," See
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274 (1909).
8. James Stewart & Co. v. Sandrakula, 309 U.S. 431 (1940); Murray v. Joe
Gerrick & Co., 291 U.S. 315' (1934); Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. v.
McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542 (1885).
9. Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co., 291 U.S. 315 (1934).
10. Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929). See Note, Jurisdiction
Over Ceded Territories, 1 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 272 (1928).
11. U.S. INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER
FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES, Reports pt. 1, at 81-125 (1956).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952); Act of June 6, 1940 c. 240, 54 STAT. 234; Act of
June 20, 1935, c. 284, 49 STAT. 394; Act of June 15, 1933, c. 85, 48 STAT. 152;
Act of March 4, 1909, c. 321, § 289, 35 STAT. 1145; Act of July 7, 1898, c. 576§ 2, 30 STAT. 717; Act of March 5, 1866, c. 24 § 2, 14 STAT. 13; Act of March 3,
1825, c. 65 § 3, 4 STAT. 115.
13. Act of June 6, 1940 c. 240, 54 STAT. 234; Act of June 20, 1935, c. 284, 49
STAT. 394; Act of June 15, 1933, c. 85, 48 STAT. 152; Act of March 4, 1909, c. 321,§ 289, 35 STAT.. 1145; Act of July 7, 1898, c. 576 § 2, 30 STAT. 717; Act of March
5, 1866, c. 24 §2, 14 STAT. 13; Act of March 3, 1825, c. 65 §3, 4 STAT. 115.
JUNE 1958]
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ence at the time the acts were enacted. 1 4  Such adoption was not an un-
lawful delegation of legislative authority since in so doing " . . . Con-
gress [had] acted as definitely as if it had repeated the words used by the
several states-a not unfamiliar form of law." 15 Unlike its predecessors the
present act attempts to adopt future state laws; 16 however, it is not unique
in that it makes federal law dependent on future state law.17  The Webb-
Kenyon Act 18 made it a federal crime to ship intoxicating liquors into a
state ". . . to be received, possessed, sold or in any manner used .
in violation of any law [present or future] of such state." In answer to
those who attacked the Webb-Kenyon Act as an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the states,19 the Supreme Court said:
14. There were two general methods of adoption in these earlier statutes. One
method was to adopt state laws existing on the date of the enactment, allowing no
subsequent changes or repeals of state law to be effective in the federal enclave.
The other was to adopt state criminal laws existing on the date of adoption, but
only if these laws remained in force. This latter method in effect raises the same
constitutional questions of delegation to the states as the present act (since the power
to repeal legislation is the power to legislate), but the question was apparently
never litigated.
15. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 167-68 (1919) (dissenting
ouinion). See Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (1910) ; Hemans v. United
States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947).
16. The statute provides that the question of whether an act committed in a
federal enclave will be a crime, is determined by ". . . the laws of the state in
force at the time of such act . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
17. In the famous case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824),
Chief Justice Marshall, speaking in reference to an act which required all harbor
pilots in United States ports to continue to be regulated in conformity with state
laws thereafter enacted, said: ". . . Although Congress cannot enable a state to
legislate, Congress may adopt the provisions of a state on that subject. . . . But
the act, it may be said, is prospective also, and the adoption of laws to be made in the
future presupposes the right in the maker to legislate on the subject." Also, there
was a series of federal statutes which were essentially the same as the present
Assimilative Crimes Act, but applied to specific national parks. Act of March 2,
1929, c. 583 § 3, 45 STAT. 463; Act of April 25, 1928, c. 434 § 3, 45 STAT. 459; Act
of June 2, 1920, c. 218, §4, 41 STAT. 731; Act of August 21, 1916, c. 368, §3,
38 STAT. 522; Act of August 22, 1914, c. 264, § 3, 38 STAT. 699; Act of April
20, 1904, c. 1406 § 5, 33 STAT. 188; Act of May 7, 1894, c. 72 § 3, 28 STAT. 73.
One of these acts, Act of June 2, 1920, supra, was applied in Burns v. United
States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927), but the question of constitutionality was not raised,
See FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1952), which based the liability
of the United States on the ". . . laws of the place where the act or omission
occurred."; SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, 64 STAT. 492 .(1950), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§416 (h) (1952), which provides that an applicant shall be considered a husband
or wife of an insured individual ". . . if the court of the state in which such insured
individual is domiciled at the time such applicant filed an application . . . would
find that such applicant and such insured individual were validly married at the
time such applicant files such application . . ."; BANKRUPTCY ACT, 30 STAT. 548
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §24 (1952), which provides that it shall not affect
the allowance of exemptions prescribed " . . . by the state laws in force at the time
of the filing of the petition . . ."; WEBB-KENYON ACT, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1952),
which prohibited the shipment of intoxicating liquors into a state to be used
". .. in violation of any law [present or future] of such state . . ."; FEDERAL
BLACK BAss ACT, 44 STAT. 576, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §852 (1952), which pro-
hibited the transportation of fish in interstate commerce contrary to the law of the
state from which it is shipped.
18. 27 U.S.C. §122 (1952).
19. See 30 Ops. Arr'v. GEN. 88 (1913) ; 49 CONG. REc. 4291 (1913).
[VOL. 3.
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ii... This argument rests upon a misconception. It is true the
regulation . . . permits state prohibitions to apply to movements
of liquor from one state into another, but the will which caused the
prohibitions would cease the instant the Act of Congress ceased to
apply." 20
The Federal Tort Claims Act 2 1 waives the sovereign immunity of the
United States from liability for its torts and in so doing, it too provides
for the determination of such liability" . . . in accordance with the
law [present or future] of the place where the act or omission occurred."
Despite these and numerous other cases in which congressional legislation
has been made dependent on future state laws, the Supreme Court has
never invalidated an act of Congress as being an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the states.
22
There appears to be no significant distinction between the dependence
on future state law involved in the present Act and that involved in the
Webb-Kenyon or Federal Tort Claims Act.2 Although one might take
issue with the use of this type of legislation,
24 particularly in an area which
has such a direct and serious effect on personal liberties, any attack based
on a theory of unlawful delegation seems destined to failure. However,
the case is noteworthy in that it carries the adoption theory of legislation to
20. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311, 326 (1916).
21. 28 U.S.C. §1346 (1952).
22. Despite the innumerable references to the rule that Congress may not
delegate its legislative authority, there exist only three cases in which the Supreme
Court has held federal legislation to be an unlawful delegation of legislative au-
thority: Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (involving unlawful
delegation to a private group of persons) ; Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (involving unlawful delegation to the President); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (involving unlawful delegation to the
President). However, in the light of such cases as United States v. Rock-Royal
Co-Operatives, 307 U.S. 533 (1939) ; N.B.C. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) ;
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) ; and Lichter v. United States, 334
U.S. 742 (1948), it is questionable whether the Panama case or the Schechter
case would be followed today. See DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §27 (1951), "The
Panama case clearly is no longer followed. The Schechter case is probably dis-
tinguished from all others in quantity of power delegated-power to approve detailed
codes to govern all business subject to federal authority."
On the other hand see Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495 (1940)
and State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 121 Me. 438, 117 Atl. 588 (1922), where state
courts have held invalid certain state laws which attempted to adopt future federal
legislation, as being an unlawful delegation of legislative authority.
23. The Webb-Kenyon Act was intended to cooperate with and complement
the laws of those states which chose prohibition, since the commerce clause prohibited
their making laws which burdened interstate commerce. The Federal Tort Claims
Act was merely intended to waive federal immunity in tort actions. Thus the
subject matter and scope of these laws was necessarily limited but their dependence
on future state legislation is undeniable.
24. In congressional debate prior to the 1933 Assimilative Crimes Act, several
Senators denounced the Act as ". . . a lousey way of legislating . . . indolent
legislation . . . " 77 CONG. REc. 5530-32 (1933).
6
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a logical extreme. 25  Furthermore, it illustrates the importance of making
a distinction between adoption and delegation.20 The dissent failed to
recognize this distinction. As a result, they attempted to apply the rule of
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,27 which requires Congress to set up a
standard to guide the President in determining what prohibitions should
be placed on the shipment of petroleum in interstate commerce. Ob-
viously there is no need for a standard or a guide in adoption type legisla-
tion since Congress and not the state performs the only legislative act.28
Whether the Court will look favorably on such legislation in the future will
no doubt depend upon practical necessity rather than abstract logic.
Perhaps this is why the majority failed to explain the prospective adoption
theory in more detail, despite obvious confusion on the part of their
colleagues. At any rate, the present decision should not be thought of
as over-ruling the doctrine of unlawful delegation of legislative authority 29
but rather as offering a convenient exception to that barrier.
Gerald R. Stockman.
25. If we begin with the premise of the dissent that the essence of lawmaking
is the determination of a policy, it would appear that Congress could not enact
a law which said: Hereafter the several state legislatures shall make all federal
criminal laws necessary for the governing of those federal enclaves within their
respective states. The only policy effected in such a law is a policy of allowing
the state to legislate for them. This is in direct conflict with the doctrine of un-
lawful delegation. In the present act, this case states Congress' policy to be that
of "allowing our laws to conform with the laws of the states." The result in either
case is an identical set of laws. However, the former would be unconstitutional
since Congress .has delegated the task of legislating to an agent (the state). Thelatter would not be unconstitutional because Congress, rather than delegating this
function to an agent, has adopted the laws of the state.
26. The majority opinion failed to explain this distinction between delegation
and adoption. Delegation necessarily implies the existence of a second party, one
who will accept the legislative authority. That party is an agent for Congress.
Furthermore, the act of legislating is an intentional as well as an intelligent act.
When a state legislature passes a criminal law, they do not intend that their act
should create a federal crime; nor have they accepted any agency from Congress.
Their intent is to create a state crime only. Thus, in regard to the federal crime
which results by operation of the Assimilative Crimes Act, they have not legislated
at all, since they neither accepted the agency to act for Congress nor intended to
legislate for the federal enclaves.
27. 293 U.S. 388 (1934).
28. There is, however, merit in the dissenting opinion of the present case, despite
the fact that they erred in concluding that ". . . it is the state not the Congress that is
exercising the legislative power under the Assimilative Crimes Act . . ." It points out
the fact that the essence of lawmaking is the determination of a policy. The onlypolicy Congress has promulgated under the present act is a policy of conformity
between the law of the state and the law of the federal enclave. It is arguable
that conformity is not the result to be achieved but rather the means to an end,
i.e., the establishment of a comprehensive set of criminal laws for the enclave.
This in effect leads to the conclusion that Congress has not legislated at all, or atleast not to a degree commensurate with the seriousness of the laws which result.
On this basis one might attack the majority's conclusion that the act was "... a
reasonable exercise of congressional legislative power and discretion."
29. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL-
NECESSITY OF REQUEST FOR TRIAL.
State v. O'Leary (N.J. 1957).
In May, 1929, the defendant was indicted by a grand jury along with
five others for murder. In December, 1934, he was arraigned; and after
a plea of not guilty, he was released on bail. The case lay dormant until
January, 1957, when the open indictment was discovered, and the de-
fendant was again arrested. The trial started in March, 1957. During
the entire delay, the defendant made no attempt to have his case tried.
Before trial, a motion was made to dismiss the indictment upon the ground
that the unusual delay had prejudiced the defendant. The motion was
denied and the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, affirmed, holding, inter alia,'
that since the defendant had made no attempt to have a trial date fixed and
since there was no evidence of prejudice to his defense, the mere fact that
his trial was long delayed would not allow him to go free under the Con-
stitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. State v. O'Leary, 135 A. 2d 321
(N.J. 1957).2
The right to a speedy trial is one of the fundamental safeguards of
the individual against the abuse of the police power of the state.
3 The
right was recognized at common law ' and has been afforded protection by
the Federal Constitution 5 and by the constitutions of many of the states.
6
Numerous states have supplemented the constitutional guaranty with
statutes prescribing a time limit upon delay of trial.
7 These statutes
dictate what is to be regarded as a speedy trial within the meaning of the
constitutional requirement.8 Some states hold these laws to be mandatory
and impose on the state the affirmative duty to bring the accused to trial
1. The court also reviewed the trial court's rulings as to the admissibility of
certain evidence, certain charges to the jury, and a denial of a motion for mistrial.
2. State v. O'Leary, 135 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1957).
3. State v. Appice, 23 N.J. Super. 522, 93 A.2d 200 (1952).
4. "At common law-even at very ancient common law-a prisoner's right to
a speedy trial was secured to him by the commission of jail delivery, whereby
the jails were cleared, and the prisoners therein confined either convicted and
punished, or delivered from custody, twice every year." In re Begerow, 136
Cal. 293, 68 Pac. 773, 774 (1902) (dictum).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Of course, this amendment has no application
to proceedings in state courts. State v. Swain, 147 Ore. 207, 31 P.2d 745 (1934).
Whether denial of a speedy trial is denial of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution seems to be an open question. See
People v. Den Uyl, 320 Mich. 477, 31 N.W.2d 699 (1948).
6. E.g., IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 10; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 9; Mo. CONST. art. 1,
§ 18a; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 10; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
7. Usually, the time limit prescribed is from sixty days to three terms of court
after indictment. See People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 246 N.W. 60 (1933).
8. Ex parte Ford, 160 Cal. 334, 116 Pac. 757 (1911) ; People v. Foster, 261
Mich. 247, 246 N.W. 60 (1933).
JUNE 1958]
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within the prescribed time. 9 Most jurisdictions interpret the statutes as
only offering the accused a right which he must demand or such will be
deemed waived.' The right may be waived not only by a consensual
delay," but also by failure to resist postponement. 1 2  Some decisions in-
dicate that although there is an absence of the necessary demand, the in-
dictment may still be dismissed if the accused can show prejudice to his
defense caused by the delay.' 8 Certain circumstances have been held to
constitute good cause for delay,14 thus altering the time period laid down
by the state.' 5 Generally, the protection of the constitutional guaranty
and the statutory supplement are held to extend not only to one in prison 'I
but also to an accused admitted to bail. 7  Some statutes provide ex-
9. State v. Carrillo, 41 Ariz. 170, 16 P.2d 965 (1932) ; Ex parte Trull, 133
Kan. 165, 298 Pac. 775 (1931); State v. Rosenberg, 71 Ore. 389, 142 Pac. 624(1914) ; Ex parte Chalfant, 81 W. Va. 93, 93 S.E. 1032 (1917).
10. People v. Dale, 79 Cal. App. 2d 370, 179 P.2d 870 (1947); State v.
Slorah, 118 Me. 203, 106 Atl. 768 (1919); People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 246
N.W. 60 (1933); State v. Smith, 10 N.J. 84, 89 A.2d 404 (1952); Head v. State,
9 Okla. Crim. 356, 131 Pac. 937 (1913); State v. Bohn, 67 Utah 362, 248 Pac.
119 (1926); Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 133 S.E. 764 (1926).
There are no supplementary federal statutes to the Sixth Amendment guaranty.
Delay is no violation of this guaranty without a demand for trial. Pietch v.
United States, 110 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 648 (1940). But
cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b), which allows a court to dismiss the indictment if there
is an unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial.
11. Ex parte Baxter, 121 Kan. 636, 249 Pac. 610 (1926); State v. Pierson,
343 Mo. 841, 123 S.W.2d 149 (1938); Glebe v. State, 106 Neb. 251, 183 N.W. 295
(1921).
12. Head v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. 356, 131 Pac. 937 (1913); Raine v. State,
143 Tenn. 168, 226 S.W. 189 (1920).
13. See State v. Dandridge, 37 N.J. Super. 144, 117 A.2d 153 (1955) where
there was a delay of nine years before the defendant was brought to trial. The
court upheld the conviction because there was no proof of a request for trial nor
of any prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay, saying at page 155:
"[The defendant does not] enlighten us with respect to who his witnesses were,
the nature of their expected testimony, or how such witnesses might have aided
him in his defense."
The court in the instant case expressly stated: "... the slightest proof of
embarassment occasioned by the delinquency of the prosecution might well . . .
have tilted our decision in O'Leary's favor." State v. O'Leary, 135 A.2d 321,
325 (N.J. 1957).
14. Speedy trial statutes are of two general categories. One type provides
that if the accused is not brought to trial within a stated period of time, he is
discharged unless good cause for delay is shown. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1382(Deering 1949). The other type differs in that it does not contain an express
qualifying clause concerning good cause. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 915.01 (1943).
However, it is held that good cause is an implied excuse for delay in these latter
statutes. See U.C.L.A. INTRA. L. REV. 76 (1952-53).
15. E.g., People v. Cryder, 90 Cal. App. 2d 194, 202 P.2d 765 (1949) (mistrial);
People v. Camilo, 69 Cal. 540, 11 Pac. 128 (1886) (illness of trial judge) ; State
v. Lee, 110 Ore. 682, 224 Pac. 627 (1924) (want of time to try case in that term) ;
State v. Pratt, 20 S.D. 44, 107 N.W. 538 (1906) (absence of material witnesses).
16. Ex parte Munger, 29 Okla. Crim. 407, 234 Pac. 219 (1925). One serving
a sentence under a prior conviction is entitled to a speedy trial of other crimes
with which he is charged. Harris v. State, 194 Md. 288, 71 A.2d 36 (1950).
17. State v. Carrillo, 41 Ariz. 170, 16 P.2d 965 (1932) ; Ex parte Miller, 66 Colo.
261, 180 Pac. 749 (1919) ; People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 246 N.W. 60 (1933).
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pressly for both situations, usually prescribing a shorter period with respect
to one in actual custody.18
The rule of the instant case concerning the need of a demand for
trial in order to gain protection under the constitutional provision which
guarantees the right to a speedy trial, is in conformity with the weight
of authority. 19 While this general rule may be a sound one, the unusually
long delay in the instant case makes the decision vulnerable to attack
on a far more basic point. The decision seems to ignore one of the principal
goals of society in punishing a breach of its laws, that of rehabilitation.
The purpose of the state in inflicting a deserved penalty is not vengeance,
20
but is for the reformation of the convicted offender, and as a deterrent to
others who might be disposed to commit such a crime.21 In the light of
these accepted theories for the justification of criminal punishment, the
decision in the instant case seems to be questionable. The prescribed
penalty is valueless to society from the standpoint of rehabilitation, and
appears to be solely a measure of retribution for a violation of the law. If
the conviction were reversed, the decision would be more consistent with
the accepted goals of criminal jurisprudence in that it would avoid the
implication that the penalty was founded on vengeance alone. This result
would leave the deterrence theory unaffected because of the uniqueness
of the circumstances. Perhaps, the total elimination of the need for a trial
demand would be the solution to future injustices under similar fact
situations.
Donald G. Jewitt.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT To INFER DELIBERATION
AND PREMEDITATION.
People v. Steward (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
Defendant lived with her three small children and a woman companion,
Mrs. Hosford, with whom she had many differences. Defendant and Mrs.
18. E.g., Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 545.890, 545.900 (1953). (If accused is confined, he
must be tried before end of second term; if he is on bail, before end of third term.)
19. See note 10 supra.
20. ". . . [Plunishment for sake of punishment, or for vengeance alone, has no
place in the processes of human tribunals." Gabriel v. Brame, 200 Miss. 767, 28
So. 2d 581 (1947). See also, Williams v. People, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); France v.
State, 95 Okla. Crim. 244, 244 P.2d 341 (1952).
21. Law v. State, 238 Ala. 428, 191 So. 803 (1939) ; People v. Smith, 163 Misc.
469, 297 N.Y.S. 489 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ; France v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 244, 244 P.2d
341 (1952). See also AovisoRY COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL PROBATION AND
PAROLE AsSOCIATION, GUIDES To SENTENCING (1957).
Other objectives of punishment which have been advanced: Ex parte France,
38 Idaho 627, 224 Pac. 433 (1924) (protection of society) ; People v. Smith, 163 Misc.
469, 297 N.Y.S. 489 (1937) (deter one convicted from future crime) ; State v. Meyer,
163 Ohio St. 279, 126 N.E.2d 585 (1955) (punish the accused) ; Simone v. State,
157 Tex. Crim. 393, 248 S.W.2d 938 (1952) (suppress crime) ; Wilborn v. Saunders,
170 Va. 153, 195 S.E. 723 (1938) (preservation of peace and good order).
JUNE 1958]
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Hosford frequented various barrooms in which they were often seen to
argue. Defendant was usually the aggressor and on one occasion had threat-
ened to kill her companion. On the night of the murder defendant had been
drinking and returned to the house with two sailors and a bottle of vodka.
She awoke Mrs. Hosford and opened the vodka. Then she awoke her two
and one-half year old daughter, forced her to puff a cigarette, and accused
Mrs. Hosford of teaching the child to smoke. Whereupon defendant seized
a knife and attacked Mrs. Hosford, saying she was going to kill her. Mrs.
Hosford was cut about the head and body but managed to escape and fled
the house as had the two sailors. The following morning the child's dead
body was found in bed with 38 stab wounds. An attempt had been made to
clean the body and clothing. At the trial, defendant's testimony was largely
unintelligible. The jury found her guilty of first degree murder and she
appealed. The appellate court held that from all the circumstances there
was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict and the conviction
was affirmed. People v. Steward, 318 P.2d 806 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).1
In California, first degree murder is "all murder which is perpetrated
by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or any other kind of wilful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing . .. -2 The terms "wilful, de-
liberate, and premeditated" have been judicially defined on numerous
occasions.3 In People v. Caldwell,4 "wilful, deliberate and premeditated"
were said to require "considerably more reflection than the amount of
thought necessary to form the intention." In People v. Bender,5 the court
stated that " 'deliberate' means 'formed, arrived at, or determined upon as
a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations.' " In this view
some appreciable time lapse sufficient to make value judgments and calculate
risks is a prerequisite to sustain a verdict of first degree murder for a
wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing.6 On the other hand, there is
another line of authority which holds that murder may be deliberate and
premeditated no matter how short the time between the first contemplation
of the matter and the crime.7 Typical of this view is that of Pennsylvania 8
with a statute almost identical to that of California.9 In Commonwealth v.
1. People v. Steward, 318 P.2d 806 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
2. CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (Deering 1949).
3. People v. Caldwell, 43 Cal. 2d 864, 279 P.2d 539 (1955) ; People v. Cornett,
33 Cal. 2d 33, 198 P.2d 877 (1948); People v. Bender, 27 Cal. 2d 164, 163 P.2d 8
(1945) ; People v. Griggs, 17 Cal. 2d 621, 110 P.2d 1031 (1941).
4. 43 Cal. 2d 864, 869, 279 P.2d 539, 542 (1955).
5. 27 Cal. 2d 164, 163 P.2d 8, 19 (1945).
6. See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 805-806 (1952).
7. Aldridge v. United States, 47 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1931) ; Wooten v. State,
104 Fla. 597, 140 So. 474 (1932) ; State v. Hall, 54 Nev. 213, 13 P.2d 624 (1932)
Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868).
8. Commonwealth v. Scott, 284 Pa. 159, 130 Atl. 317 (1925) ; Commonwealth v.
Daynarowicz, 275 Pa. 235, 119 At. 77 (1922); Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9
(1868).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1936). The Pennsylvania statute omits "tor-
ture" and substitutes "kidnapping" for "mayhem."
[VOL. 3.
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Drum,'0 the court said, "[t] he law fixes upon no length of time as necessary
to form the intention to kill, but leaves the existence of a fully formed intent
as a fact to be determined by the jury from all the facts and circumstances
in the evidence." While in essence, the two views represent only a differ-
ence in emphasis, this difference would be sufficient to sustain a conviction
of first degree murder in Pennsylvania where reduction to second degree
murder would be required in California."
In the instant case the court rejected the doctrine of transferred in-
tent,' 2 and reasoned that because the jury would be justified in believing
that the defendant had deliberately formed an intent to kill Mrs. Hosford,
it could find that this murderous assault was then turned upon the defend-
ant's child immediately after Mrs. Hosford fled. Admittedly, there is evi-
dence upon which a jury could find that defendant deliberated and pre-
meditated before attacking Mrs. Hosford."8 However, measured by the
judicial interpretation of the terms "deliberation and premeditation" in
California,1 4 there is hardly sufficient evidence upon which a jury could
infer that defendant carefully considered and reflected after turning upon
Mrs. Hosford. Considering what took place after she returned to the
house, it is better argued that defendant's tempestuous and precipitous
conduct negatives an inference that she was possessed of the presence of
mind necessary for deliberation and premeditation. There would be no
opportunity for deliberation and premeditation between the time her atten-
tion had first centered upon Mrs. Hosford and the time she turned upon
the child.15 To find evidence of the requisite mental state in these circum-
stances is to call upon something akin to "transferred deliberation and
premeditation." The other evidence upon which the jury might have based
its verdict was the infliction of multiple wounds upon the victim. However,
in People v. Caldwell,16 decided by the California supreme court, it was
10. 58 Pa. 9, 16 (1868).
11. The difference would be an evidentiary one in that in Pennsylvania no evidence
of a specific time lapse would seem to be necessary in order to sustain a finding that
defendant deliberated and premeditated, while in California evidence of some definite
time lapse would appear to be necessary.
12. 318 P.2d at 810. It pointed out that the doctrine of transferred intent would
only apply had defendant lunged at Mrs. Hosford and stabbed the child inadvertently
when Mrs. Hosford stepped aside.
13. See People v. Cartwright, 305 P.2d 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956), where the
court said ". . . the existence of these elements is logically derived by inference
from defendant's words and conduct prior to the shooting." In the principal case the
evidence of defendant's past bad relations with Mrs. Hosford would warrant a finding
that defendant had deliberated and premeditated killing Mrs. Hosford before the night
of the murder.
14. See note 3 supra.
15. In finding support for the verdict, the court said that the jury could have
found that after Mrs. Hosford's escape the defendant directed her murderous assault
against the child. Such a finding would negative any inference of a delay before the
child was killed. Since there was no other evidence of defendant's prior attitude
towards the child which would warrant the inference that defendant had premeditated
the child's death, the jury could not have inferred that defendant had premeditated
and deliberated after turning from Mrs. Hosford.
16. 279 P.2d at 539.
JUNE. 1958]
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said that "if the evidence showed no more than the infliction of multiple
acts of violence on the victim, it would not be sufficient to show that the
killing was the result of careful thought and weighing of considerations."
It may be said that the evidence here is more 17 than sufficient to support
the jury's determination that the defendant intended to take the life of her
victim, but there is no evidence upon which to support an inference that
defendant deliberated and premeditated before taking that life. To say
that there is, goes further than to hold that deliberation and premeditation
may be instantaneous,1 8 and seems to depart from the requirements for
finding those elements heretofore obtaining in California.
John J. Cleary.
EVIDENCE-GRUESOME PHOTOGRAPHS-
ADMISSION IN MURDER TRIAL.
State v. Bucanis (N.J. 1958).
The defendant was indicted for first degree murder for the shooting
of his wife and was convicted in the trial court of second degree murder.
The fact of the shooting was admitted, defendant claiming it was done
accidentally while he was trying to frighten his wife; the state contended
that it was deliberate and premeditated. The defendant appealed, contend-
ing that it was prejudicial error for the state to introduce photographs of
the deceased in the morgue during and after the autopsy. The photograph
in question showed the torso of the deceased where incisions had been
made allowing the flesh to be retracted and exposing the abdominal organs
and the inner structure of the chest. The state introduced this photograph
to show the path of the bullet through the body. The supreme court held
that the photograph was gruesome and sound judicial discretion dictated
its exclusion but that it was not substantially prejudicial so as to require a
reversal under the plain error rule. The court applied the plain error rule
because it found defendant's objection in the trial court insufficient to raise
the issue of the inflamatory and prejudicial nature of the photographs.
State v. Bucanis, 138 A.2d 739 (N.J. 1958).1
Photographic evidence is an item of real proof allegedly used anal-
ogously to the employment of the victim's bloody clothing to show position
of the wounds but which is in reality introduced primarily for its effect upon
17. The court said that much more appears than the isolated fact that deceased
was unlawfully killed to warrant the jury's verdict. 318 P.2d at 811.
18. See Aldridge v. United States, 47 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
1. State v. Bucanis, 138 A.2d 739 (N.J. 1958).
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the jury. However, there is ample authority for the proposition that
photographs, even those depicting gruesome scenes, may be exhibited to
the jury if they are relevant to some material issue.2 This rule applies
where the facts shown by the photographs have already been established by
other proof, and the effect of the photographs is merely cumulative, so long
as they pass the test of relevancy.3 The most common use of such photo-
graphs is to show the position of the body or the direction of the infliction
of wounds, to rebut the defendant's claim of self-defense, to prove that the
death was not suicide or to clarify the circumstances of a killing.
4 No
cases have been found where a purely prejudicial photograph has been
admitted.3 Authorities are generally in accord that the admission of photo-
graphs is a matter of discretion for the trial judge which will not be over-
ruled except in a clear case of abuse.6 The modern trend in this area of
the law is to recognize that when a photograph has some relevance, but its
value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the jury, it should be ex-
cluded. Evidence of this trend is State v. Edwards 
7 where the South
Carolina court held that photographs which are calculated to arouse the
sympathy of the jury are properly excluded if they are irrelevant or not
substantially necessary to show material facts or conditions. In an Alabama
case, McKee v. State," it was relevant to the state's case to prove that the
deceased died from a ruptured spleen caused by the defendant's blow. In
reversing the trial court, the supreme court held that it was error to exhibit
photographs taken in the morgue showing the vital organs of the deceased.
The court held that only so much of the organs as was necessary should
be exposed.9 Other jurisdictions, while not going as far as these courts,
have weighed the probative value of the photograph against its prejudicial
2. State v. DeZer, 230 Minn. 39, 41 N.W.2d 313 (1950) ; Handcock v. State, 209
Miss. 523, 47 So. 2d 833 (1950) ; Hampton v. State, 148 Neb. 547, 28 N.W.2d 322
(1947) ; State v. Burrell, 112 N.J.L. 330, 170 Atl. 843 (E. & A. 1937); State v.
Nyland, 47 Wash. 2d 240, 287 P.2d 345 (1955). See cases collected at 159 A.L.R.
1414 (1945).
3. People v. Berkart, 211 Cal. 726, 297 Pac. 11 (1951) ; State v. Fine, 110 N.J.L.
67, 164 Ati. 433 (1933) ; Commonwealth v. Yaeger, 329 Pa. 81, 196 Atl. 827 (1930).
4. See Commonwealth v. Earnest, 342 Pa. 544, 21 A.2d 38 (1941).
5. See West v. State, 218 Miss. 326, 331, 67 So. 2d 366, 370 (1953), where the court
said, "We adhere to the rule that if photographs which disclose the gruesome aspect
of a crime are not pertinent, relevant, competent, or material on any issue in the case
and serve the purpose solely of inflaming the minds of the jurors and prejudicing them
against the accused they should not be admitted into evidence."
6. See Commonwealth v. Nixon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N.E.2d 814 (1946) ; State v.
Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 115 A.2d 62 (1955) ; State v. Johnson 57 N.M. 716, 263 P.2d 282
(1953) ; State v. Jones, 228 S.C. 484, 91 S.E.2d 1 (1956) ; State v. Whitt, 129 W.Va.
187, 40 S.E.2d 319 (1946). See also Sco'rr, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 602 (1942).
7. 194 S.C. 410, 10 S.E.2d 587 (1940).
8. 33' Ala. App. 171, 31 So. 2d 656 (1947).
9. When the instant case is compared with this holding the prejudicial effect of
the photograph becomes more apparent. While it might have been relevant to show
the path of-the bullet through the body it was not 'necessary to do so with a photo-
graph that the court describes as: "The picture under discussion here was gruesome
and horrifying. It portrayed the disemboweled body of the victim after an autopsy
and was repulsive beyond description." State v. Bucanis, 138 A.2d 739, 743 (N.J 1958).
14
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effect. 10 The California courts have adopted this view in two recent cases.
In People v. Burns " the defendant's conviction was reversed because the
trial judge had abused his discretion in admitting photographs which were
gruesome. These photographs depicted the head and body of the deceased
after an autopsy had been performed showing the head shaved and the
incisions made during the autopsy. The decision was reversed even though
the issue was whether the decease had fallen or was beaten to death.
In People v. Redstone 12 the court held that to admit photographs showing
surgical incisions upon the shaved, severed head of the deceased in a
prosecution for murder arising from an altercation was error.
The decision in the instant case indicates that the New Jersey court is
not willing to follow the recent trend and adopt the rule followed in the
California courts. The facts of the case seem to present a perfect oppor-
tunity for a reversal. Nor does it appear that society would be substantially
harmed if the defendant were granted a second trial. Here the court, while
admitting that sound judicial discretion dictated the photograph's exclu-
sion, 13 was able to avoid a reversal by invoking the plain error rule.14
Although the decision is technically correct under the but-for test '5 of the
plain error rule, it disregards the effect this photograph had on the jury.
It would be difficult to find that the repulsive nature of the photograph did
not have an underlying prejudicial effect on the jury while they were de-
ciding the issues. The New Jersey court will eventually have to decide
the admissability, on the proper objection, of a substantially similar photo-
graph.' 6 It is submitted that the court should apply the test of the
California courts and balance the probative value of the photograph against
its prejudicial effect upon the jury (both objectively and subjectively),
and reverse where necessary without regard to procedural rules.
Edward J. Carney, Jr.
10. Craft v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 700, 229 S.W.2d 465 (1950); State v.Morgan, 211 La. 572, 30 So. 2d 434 (1947) ; Lee v. State, 147 Neb. 333, 23 N.W.2d316 (1946) ; State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205, 290 P.2d 440 (1955) ; Commonwealth v.Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949).
11. 109 Cal. 2d 524, 241 P.2d 308 (1952).
12. 139 Cal. App. 2d 485, 293 P.2d 880 (1956).
13. 138 A.2d at 743.
14. The New Jersey Plain Error Rule, R.R. 1:5-1, provides, "The court may,however, notice plain errors affecting substantial rights of the defendant, although
they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. If it shall appear, after
challenge interposed by the defendant in the appellate court, that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence, the judgment shall be reversed and a new trial
ordered."
15. The test required under the plain error rule appears to be: but for thisphotograph, would the defendant have been convicted?
16. It is arguable that the same result could be reached as in the instant case sincethe plain error rule further provides: "Error in the admission or rejection of testi-
mony . . . shall be cause for reversal if specific objection thereto was made and it
appears from the entire record of the proceedings had upon the trial that the defendant
thereby suffered manifest wrong or injury." (emphasis added). R.R. 1:5-1.
[VOL. 3.
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JURISDICTION-WARSAW CONVENT1ON AND FEDERAL DEATH
ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT-WRONGFUL DEATH
IN THE AIR ABOVE THE HIGH SEAS.
Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana (2d Cir. 1957).
Marshal Noel was a passenger aboard an airliner operated by defend-
ant corporation which is owned by the United States of Venezuela. He was
killed 30 miles off the coast of New Jersey. Noel's executors brought a civil
action in the United States District Court alleging that because of the de-
fendant's "wrongful acts, neglect, default and misconduct" Noel waskilled
when the plane plunged into the sea. While basing the action both on the
Warsaw Convention ' and the Federal Death on the High Seas Act,2 the
plaintiff demanded a jury trial. The action was dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. Plaintiff amended his complaint alleging death in the airspace over
the sea. The district court adhered to its original decision, saying that there
was no material difference between death on or above the sea. On appeal
the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Warsaw Convention provides
for no independent right of action, whether or not the party has any other
remedy, and further, that any rights under the Federal Death on the High
Seas Act are cognizable only in admiralty; hence the action was properly
dismissed. The court gave no opinion on whether the Federal Death on
the High Seas Act grants a right of action for wrongful death in airspace
over the sea. Dismissal was without prejudice to plaintiff's right to transfer
the case to the admiralty side.8
In interpreting Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, concerning pas-
senger injury 4 the decisions have split on the question of whether it has
created an independent right of action for wrongful deaths occurring in
international aerial flights.5 Some courts in interpreting the phrase, "shall
be liable," hold that the Convention is self-executing and creates a right of
action for injury or death of a passenger." In support of this position,
courts point to later sections which develop the cause of action by provisions
1. 49 STAT. 3000 (1934).
2. 41 STAT. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1952).
3. Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957).
4. "Article 17. Injury to passenger. The carrier shall be liable for damage
sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger, if the accident which
caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." 49 STAT. 3000, 3018 (1934).
5. Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), re7id on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
820 (1954).
6. Salamon v. Koninklike Luchvaart Maatschappi, 107 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct.
1951), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 965, 120 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1st Dept. 1953). See also Ross
v. Pan American Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
957 (1955) ; Garcia v. Pan American Airways, 269 App. Div. 297, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317
(1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741 (1946), 338 U.S.
824 (1949).
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relating to limitation of liability,7 contributory negligence 8 and statute of
limitations.9  The other view is that the lex loci delicti creates the cause
of action and the Convention merely affixed conditions to that right of
action, or more specifically, that the Convention creates only a presumption
of liability where there is already a lex loci cause of action.10 In Komlos
v. Compagnie Nationale Air France," upon which the authority for the
present holding is based, 12 it was said by way of dictum that the Conven-
tion creates no right of action where the lex loci does, but if the lex loci does
not provide such, the forum could apply Article 17 and it might be said
that then the Convention creates the right of action for the wrongful death.' 3
The instant case specifically rejects this proposition and follows the view
that the lex loci creates the only cause of action although the Warsaw
Convention also applies.' 4 The decision also states that the plaintiff's al-
leged cause of action under the Federal Death on the High Seas Act,',
if any, must be brought in admiralty court. 16 In so holding, the court fol-
lows the majority view which interprets the first section of the Act '7 as
giving admiralty exclusive jurisdiction as to all causes of action arising
under the Act.' 8 However, a contrary view is held by the state courts, 19
i.e., that the admiralty jurisdiction provision is merely permissive; therefore,
under the saving clause of the Judiciary Act,2° the party has a choice of
forums in which to bring his action unless he is asking exclusively for an
admiralty remedy.21
7. 49 STAT. 3000 § 22 (1934).
8. Id. §21.
9. Id. §29.
10. Wyman v. Pan American Airways, 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1943),
aff'd, 267 App. Div. 947, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1st Dept. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882(1945); Choy v. Pan American Airways, 1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y.).
11. 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev/d on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954).
12. 247 F.2d at 679.
13. 111 F. Supp. 393, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
14. 247 F.2d at 680.
15. 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 761 (1952).
16. 247 F.2d at 680.
17. "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default occurring on the high seas . . . the personal representative of the decedent
may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in ad-
miralty. . . ." (emphasis added) 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1952).
18. Higa v. Transoceanic Airlines, 240 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Kunkel v. United
States, 140 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Cal. 1956) ; Wilson v. Transoceanic Airlines, 121 F.Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954) ; Iafrate v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 106 F.
Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
19. Some of these state courts, prior to the Act, heard actions for death on the
high seas. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907) ; Souden v. Fore River Shipbuilding
Co., 223 Mass. 509, 112 N.E. 82 (1916) ; McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N.Y. 546 (1879).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1952).
21. Sierra v:. Pan American World Airways, 107 F. Supp. 519 (D.P.R. 1952)
Batkiewicz v. Seas Shipping, 53 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ; Choy v. Pan Ameri-
can Airways, 1941, A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y.); Bugden v. Trawler Cambridge, 319
Mass. 315, 65 N.E.2d 533 (1946) ; Wyman v. Pan American Airways, 181 Misc. 963,
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The instant case illustrates the problems and uncertainties involved in
attempts to expand the rights provided by aged legislative acts to con-
temporaneous situations not contemplated by the legislature. When the
High Seas Act became law, the airplane was in its infancy, and trans-
oceanic air travel was unknown. Yet today, we find that an action for
wrongful death of an airline passenger which occurs in the air over the sea
may be brought, if at all, only under this Act, and hence only in the ad-
miralty courts. In such courts there is no right to a jury trial.22 Thus,
a plaintiff may lose his normal right to a jury trial on the facts merely be-
cause the plane has gone more than a marine league 23 from shore and
where very possibly the negligent act or wrongful conduct may have oc-
curred on the ground. The evidence necessary and the remedies sought
would be much the same as in any tort action, and no special expertise
would be required of the court. It would seem that the denial of a jury
trial, solely on the basis of such a dubious interpretation of legislative lan-
guage,24 is rightly questioned. If however, no cause of action is allowed
under the High Seas Act in a case of death occurring over the sea, we are
left with a vacuum which can be eliminated only by an even greater distor-
tion of other unrelated principles, such as the distortion of the Warsaw
Convention in the instant case. In view of the great quantitative increase
in transoceanic air travel and freight carriage, the obvious solution would
be specific air law legislation on the point; but in the absence of such, the
courts should follow that interpretation of the Federal Death on the High
Seas Act which would open the civil side to such causes of action,25 thus
providing a trial by jury.
William E. Mowatt.
NEGLIGENCE-MERCHANT MARINE ACT, 1920 (JONES ACT)-
LIABILITY IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
UNDER SECTION 33.
Kernan v. American Dredging Co. (U.S. 1958).
A seaman lost his life in a fire while serving on a tug on the Schuylkill
River in Philadelphia. The trial court found that the cause of the fire was
43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 947, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1st Dept. 1944),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945) ; Elliott v. Steinfeldt, 254 App. Div. 739, 4 N.Y.S.2d
9 (2d Dept. 1938).
22. United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796).
23. 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1952).
24. See note 19 supra.
25. See note 21 supra.
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the maintaining of an open-flame kerosene lamp at a height below the
minimum height required by the Commandant of the United States Coast
Guard.' The lamp ignited highly inflammable vapors lying above an ex-
tensive accumulation of petroleum products spread over the surface of the
river. It was found that if the lamp had been in conformity with the regula-
tion no fire would have resulted. The Supreme Court held that the Jones
Act 2 permits recovery for the death of a seaman resulting from a violation
of a statutory duty without any showing of negligence. Kernan v. Amer-
ican Dredging Co., 78 Sup. Ct. 394 (1958). 8
The Jones Act by reference 4 incorporates into maritime law a system
of statutes enacted to protect the railroad worker.5 This incorporation
serves to bring into the Jones Act all that is fairly covered by that refer-
ence.6 The Supreme Court has maintained that this reference incorporates
into maritime law new standards of liability.7 These new standards are to
1. See 33 C.F.R. § 80.16 (h) (1949). "Scows not otherwise provided for in this
section on waters described in paragraph (a) of this section shall carry a white light
at each end of each scow, except that when such scows are massed in tiers, two or
more abreast, each of the outside scows shall carry a white light on its outer bow,
and the outside scow in the last tier shall each carry, in addition, a white light on the
outer part of the stern. The white light shall be carried not less than 8 feet above
the surface of the water, and shall be so placed as to show an unbroken light all
around the horizon and shall be of such character as to be visible on a dark night
with a clear atmosphere at a distance of at least 5 miles." The Commandant is em-
powered to establish rules "as to the lights to be carried . . . as he may deem neces-
sary for safety. . . ." 30 STAT. 102 (1897), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
2. Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (Jones Act), 41 STAT. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 668
(1952), which provides: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with
the right of trial by jury, and in such actions all statutes of the United States modi-
fying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to
railway employees shall apply; and in case of death of any seaman as a result of any
such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an
action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such actions all
statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death
in the case of railway employees shall be applicable [i.e., Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952)]. Jurisdiction in
such actions shall be in the court of the district in which the defendant employer
resides or in which his principal office is located."
3. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 78 Sup. Ct. 394 (1958).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. ". . . [T]he Safety Appliance Acts [27 STAT. 531 (1893), as amended, 45
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1952)1, together with the Boiler Inspection Act [36 STAT. 913 (1911),
as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 21-34 (1952)], are substantively if not in form amendments
to the Federal Employers' Liability Act [35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 51-60 (1952)]. They dispense, for the purposes of employees' suits, with the
necessity of proving that violations of the safety statutes constitute negligence; and
making proof of such violations is effective to show negligence as a matter of law
." Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 189 (1949).
6. Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 392 (1924). This was the pioneer case
in which the constitutionality and effect of the Jones Act was considered and dealt
with at length.
7. "Section 1 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65, 45 U.S.C.
§ 51 . . . , thus incorporated in the Jones Act by reference, gives a right of recovery
for the injury or death of an employee of a common carrier by rail, in interstate or
foreign commerce, 'resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the
[VOL. 3.
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be mined from the words of the act by giving them a meaning consonant
with the attitude of Congress toward this favored class.8 The Court itself
has on occasion expressed a desire, on its own part, to treat seamen as
members of a class to be dealt with most considerately.9 It has displayed
this consideration by maintaining that, " . the act is not to be nar-
rowed by refined reasoning or for the sake of giving 'negligence' a tech-
nically restricted meaning. It is to be construed liberally to fulfill the pur-
poses for which it was enacted, and to that end the word may be read to
include 'all the meanings given to it by courts, and within the word as
ordinarily used . ... 10 To allow for this liberal interpretive policy
the Court has broken with old traditions and shaken off all the restrictions
which would limit this policy." In an effort to bring the beneficial pur-
poses of this welfare legislation 12 to as large a group as possible, the Court
has included a rather extensive list of employees within the term seamen.1
3
officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insuffi-
ciency, due to its negligence, in its . . . appliances, machinery . . . or other equip-
ment.' By section 3 of the Act, . . . contributory negligence does not bar recovery,
but is ground for apportionment of the damages between employer and employee,
and by sections 3 and 4, . . . it is provided that no employee shall be held to
have been guilty of contributory negligence or 'to have assumed the risks of his
employment in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute
enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such em-
ployee.'
The Jones Act thus brings into maritime law new rules of liability." The Arizona
v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1936).
8. "The policy of Congress, as evidenced by its legislation, has been to deal with
them as a favored class. .... In the light of and to effectuate that policy, statutes
enacted for their benefit should be liberally construed . . . ." Bainbridge v. Mer-
chants' & Miners' Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278, 282 (1932).
9. ". . . [S]eamen are the wards of the admiralty, whose traditional policy it
has been to avoid, within reasonable limits, the application of rules of the common
law which would affect them harshly because of the special circumstances attending
their calling. . . ." Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939);
Bainbridge v. Merchants' & Miners' Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278, 282 (1932).
10. Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930).
11. "The statutory cause of action to recover damages for death ushered in a
new policy and broke with old traditions. Its meaning is likely to be misread if shreds
of the discarded policy are treated as still clinging to it and narrowing its scope. .. "
Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 344 (1937). ". . . An ancient evil
was to be uprooted, and uprooted altogether. It was not to be left with fibers still
clinging to the soil." Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 159 (1934).
12. See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 (1949).
13. Butler v. Whiteman, 26 U.S.L. WEE K 3297 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1958) (No. 40)
(Whether an odd job man on a barge that had not been in service for over a year
was a seaman, held to be a jury question) ; Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co.,
26 U.S.L. WEEK 4246 (U.S. Apr. 7,1958) (No. 39) (Whether a worker on a "Texas
Tower" which was to be attached to the ocean floor was a seaman, held to be a jury
question); Senko v. La Crosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957) (an employee
hired to care for a dredge which he never boarded unless it was tied up) ; Norton v.
Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944) (a bargeman injured while pushing an engineless
barge) ; Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124 (1936) (a seaman on a coastal vessel who did
not sign articles) ; Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934) (a master of a ship)
Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1931) (a stevedore unloading a German ship)
John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930) (a land based blacksmith
working on a ship under repair but afloat in navigable waters) ; Northern Coal &
20
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It has also extended the terms of the act to include seamen injured while
on land, 1 4 and to give to all seamen injured through the negligence of a
fellow servant the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.15 The judi-
cial history of the act indicates without doubt that the old maritime law
has been completely abrogated. 16 Time and again the Court has mani-
fested an intent to apply the act to as broad a class as is imaginable,17
and to give to this class as wide a range of remedies 18 for its injuries 19
Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S..142 (1928) (a shore worker unloading coal) ; Buzynski
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 277 U.S. 226 (1928) (a stevedore struck by a negligently
dropped chain) ; Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U.S. 427 (1927) (a shore worker,
boilermaker, injured by scalding .steam).
The Court has refused to extend the term seanan in a few instances. Desper v.
Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952) (a potential operator of a sightseeing
boat while painting the boat on land in preparation for the opening of the season).
Congress has eliminated longshoremen from the benefits of the Jones Act and has
provided for their protection under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §901 (1952). But see
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
14. "There is nothing in the legislative history of the Jones Act to indicate that
its words 'in the course of his employment' do not mean what they say or that they
were intended to be restricted to injuries occurring on navigable waters. On the
contrary it seems plain that in taking over the principles of recovery already estab-
lished for railroad employees and extending them in the new admiralty setting to any
seaman injured 'in the course of his employment', Congress, in the absence of any
indication of a different purpose, must be taken to have intended to make them appli-
cable so far as the words and the Constitution permit, and to have given to them
the full support of all the constitutional power it possessed. Hence the Act allows
the recovery sought unless the Constitution forbids it." O'Donnell v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 39 (1943).
15. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 49 (1948).
16. The general maritime law prior to the Merchant Marine Act of 1915, 38 STAT.
1185 (later amended by 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1952)), allowed a
seaman no recovery of compensatory damages for injuries resulting from negligence,
in this case his recovery was limited to care and maintenance for as long as the voyage
should last. However, he was allowed to recover compensatory damages for injuries
which resulted from the unseaworthiness of the vessel. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158,
175 (1903). The compensatory damages which he could recover were lessened to
the extent that the seaman himself was guilty of contributory negligence. The Arizona
v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 122 (1936). There was no recovery of damages or indemnity
for the death of a seaman, whether his death was occasioned by the negligence of the
owner or other members of the crew or whether the death was caused by the un-
seaworthiness of the vessel. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 43 (1930).
17. See note 13 supra. The Court has refused to extend the protection of the act
to foreign seamen on foreign ships injured in foreign ports. Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571 (1953).
18. Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 209 (1955). A seaman drowned when his ship
foundered. The surviving owner died some months later of independent causes. In
deciding the Jones Act allowed survival of claims against the estate of a tortfeasor
the Court said, ". . . The Jones Act, in providing that a seaman should have the
same rights of action as would a railroad employee, does not mean that the very
words of the F.E.L.A. must be lifted bodily from their context and applied mechani-
cally to the specific facts of maritime events. Rather, it means that those contingen-
cies against which Congress has provided to ensure recovery to railroad employees
should also be met in the admiralty setting . .. ."
Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1937), allowed the estate of a
deceased seaman's mother to recover all sums due to her while she lived.
19. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949), allowed
recovery by a seaman who contracted poliomyelitis while serving in Chinese waters,
on the grounds that proper precautions were not taken to prevent such injury to his
person during an epidemic.
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as is possible. At the same time the Court has exhibited an intent to limit
to a narrow range the defenses available against the class.
20
Once the issue as to liability without fault had been settled in cases
involving railroad employees, 21 it was only a matter of time until this same
protection would be afforded seamen. The holding that a safety 
statute 22
of the United States Coast Guard Commandant will be given equal effect
with regard to seamen as Interstate Commerce Commission safety statutes
are given with regard to railroad employees, is certainly no greater a strain
on judicial reasoning than the holding that a handyman, who never went
aboard a dredge except when it was tied up, never saw the dredge move,
and was ashore cleaning lanterns when he was injured, may be called a
seamen.2 Unless Congress indicates a contrary intent in the most clear
language it appears that the Supreme Court will extend to seamen every
benefit which Congress sees fit to allow to the railroad worker.
Edward J. McLaughlin.
TORTS-PARENT AND CHILD-PARENTAL IMMUNITY
FROM LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE.
Parks v. Parks (Pa. 1957).
Plaintiff, a six month old minor, sustained personal injuries in an
accident which occurred while riding as a passenger in a car owned by her
father and operated by her mother. The mother was insured under a
liability insurance policy issued to the father. In a suit against the mother,
a preliminary objection was filed by the defendant asking judgment in her
favor on the grounds that a parent is immune from tort actions by an
unemancipated minor child. This was sustained, and on appeal the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that public policy precluded an un-
20. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 432 (1939) (Assumption
of the risk is no defense under the Jones Act) ; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110
1936) (Contributory negligence does not bar recovery, but it is grounds for apportion-
ment of the damages) ; Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S 234 (1931) (fellow-servant
doctrine held not a valid defense under the Jones Act). The Supreme Court has
established a policy of favoring jury verdicts under the Jones Act. "Under this
statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the
conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing
the injury or death for which damages are sought." Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957). Vicarious liability for a battery has been
attributed to the employer where a supervisor has struck a fellow servant. Alpha
S.S. Corp. v. Cain, 281 U.S. 642 (1930) ; Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635
(1930). Acceptance of medical care and wages until the end of the voyage has been
held not to be an election of remedies and the seaman may still recover compensatory
damages for negligence. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928).
21. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
22. See note 1 supra.
23. Senko v. La Crosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957).
22
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emancipated minor from maintaining an action in tort for damages against
its parent because of the negligent conduct of the parent even where the
injuries did not arise out of the exercise of parental discipline and con-
trol, and where any judgment against the parent would be covered by
liability insurance. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957). 1
From the leading case of Hewlett v. George2 in 1891 there has been
a steady stream of authority supporting the rule of parental immunity
from personal tort actions by an unemancipated minor child.8 The usual
reasons advanced for the rule are preservation of domestic peace and
obedience and the prevention of fraud and collusion. 4  However, these
reasons do not completely satisfy the objections that a tort for which
there is no compensation would, if anything, promote domestic discord,5 and
that in an adversary system it should not be assumed that the allegations
of a complaint arise from fraud and thus cause dismissal of the complaint.6
While the majority of jurisdictions adhere to the rule of absolute immunity
of the parent for personal torts against the child, 7 recently there has been a
judicial inclination to repudiate or modify the doctrine by following the
principle that when the reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself ceases.8
Thus, there is a growing trend to allow actions by an unemancipated child
for wilful or wanton misconduct of the parent.9 The absolute immunity
rule has been held inapplicable where there was a master-servant 10 or
carrier-passenger 1l relationship between the parent and child, or where
the negligent act was committed while the parent alone was engaged in a
business activity. 12  A minor has been permitted to maintain an action
against his parent's employer for injuries received as a result of the par-
1. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957). It was also held that thefather could not maintain an action against the wife in his own right for damages
because of injuries to the child.
2. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
3. See, e.g., Shea v. Pettee, 19 Conn. Supp. 125, 110 A.2d 492 (1954) ; Luster v.Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938) ; Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211N.W. 88 (1926) ; Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954) ; Reingold
v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 Atl. 153 (1935) ; McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn.
388, 78 S.W. 664 (1903).
4. See Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Wick v. Wick,
192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
5. See 1 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS § 8.11 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 101 (2d ed.
1955).
6. See Garcia v. Fantauzzi, 20 F.2d 524, 529 (1st Cir. 1927).
7. See note 3 supra.
8. See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) ; Borst v. Borst41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538(1932).
9. See Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952) ; Nudd v. Mat-
soukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956) ; Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218P.2d 445 (1950). See also Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) ; Cannon
v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 436 (1942).
10. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1950). See note 19, infra.
11. Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.
Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
12. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952) ; Borst v. Borst, 41
Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
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ent's negligence while acting in the course of his employment, even though
the employer had a right of indemnity or contribution from the parent
whom the child could not sue.' 3 Most jurisdictions have refused to allow an
action under wrongful death statutes against a parent or his estate for
negligence resulting in the death of the minor child,'14 or against the parent's
estate for injuries to the child,15 but it has been held that an action may be
maintained under such a statute where the death of the child resulted from
wilful misconduct of the parent.16 The fact that the parent has liability in-
surance is generally considered to be immaterial,' 7 but some courts have
held the parental immunity rule inapplicable where insurance was present
and an additional non-family relationship existed.' 8 In such a situation it
has been stated that liability in fact has been transferred from parent to the
insurer. 19
The facts of the instant case do not fit precisely within any of the
above exceptions to parental immunity, and the court has refused to add
another exception to the rule. The exceptions already made indicate that
the courts are dissatisfied with a strict application of the rule, and it is
submitted that this case should mark another such exception. Injustice
results from a broad application of the doctrine of parental immunity as a
bar to all suits by a child against his parent for personal injuries. Courts
have recognized this, but, confronted with a large body of case law, they
have been reluctant to overrule an established doctrine, and thus excep-
tions have been created. Where right and equity compel, a court should not
assist in perpetrating a broad application of a doctrine which is in large
part unjust.
13. Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 422, 150 Atl. 107
(1930) ; Radelicki v. Travis, 39 N.J. Super. 263, 120 A.2d 774 (App. Div. 1956);
Briggs v. Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super. 50, 170 Atl. 871 (1934) ; cf. Koontz v. Messer,
320 Pa. 487, 181 Att. 792 (1935).
14. Owens v. Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Cronin v.
Cronin, 244 Wis. 372, 12 N.W.2d 677 (1944). In a similar situation, where no per-
sonal injury to the minor child was involved, it was held that under a wrongful death
statute a minor had a cause of action against one parent to recover for the wrongful
death of the other. Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939).
15. Worrall v. Moran, 131 A.2d 438 (N.H. 1957) ; Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis.
645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940). Contra, Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
16. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
17. Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938) ; Elias v. Collins,
237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926) ; Bellkson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W. 1
(1932) ; Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
18. E.g., a carrier-passenger relationship. See note 11 supra.
19. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 372, 150 At. 905, 915 (1930) (master and
servant relationship). But see Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563
(1954). The Dunlap case enunciated broad principles to the effect that if the parent
was insured against liability, there would be no immunity, even without a special
relationship existing between the parent and child. But the Levesque case held that
a minor child could not maintain an action against his parent for injuries caused by
the parent's negligent operation of an automobile, even though the parent carried
liability insurance. In Worrall v. Moran, 132 A.2d 438 (N.H. 1957), which held that
a child could not sue his father's estate, the court noted that the state legislature had
recently considered two separate bills which would have allowed suits by a child against
his parent for negligence, neither of which had been approved.
JUNE 1958]
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It has been suggested that the doctrine should be narrowed to provide
for parental immunity only where the injuries occur while the -parent is
exercising (in a narrow sense) his parental duty.20 This would appear to
be desirable especially in cases where liability insurance exists. Where
liability insurance is present in auto negligence cases, as here,21 the court is
faced with the -policy question of whether such a loss will be borne by the
injured party, who happens to be a minor'child of the negligent person,
or whether the loss will be distributed to the motoring public. It appears
that the just result would be to allow the injured child to recover. Where
the parent has insured himself to protect people whom he may negligently
injure, and where the person so injured happens to be his minor child and
the injury does not arise out of parental control or discipline, it would
seem that the reason for the rule has ceased. Even though the injured is
in a certain relationship with the negligent party, real injury would be
compensated by insurance and not by the economic family unit. Such com-
pensation would more readily promote family happiness. The opportunity
for collusion would be present, but this is *so even in a suit by a unrelated
plaintiff against the insured, or in a suit by a minor nephew against his
insured uncle. Sound or not, the decision in the instant case brings out
the need for a close judicial and legislative inspection of the problem in
light of the prevalence of liability insurance.22
Vincent P. Haley.
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-NEWSWORTHY ITEMS
INTRINSICALLY PRIVILEGED.
Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co. (3d Cir. 1958)
In September, 1953, David Jenkins was brutally murdered by a
group of teen-age criminals when he went to the defense of Frank Stevens,
20. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Dminestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV.1030, 1079-81 (1930). Another suggestion is that the parental immunity doctrine
should not be applicable in cases where it is reasonably clear that domestic peace has
already been disturbed beyond repair, or where by reason of the circumstances it is
not imperiled, and where reasonableness of family discipline is not involved. See 1
HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS § 8.11 (1956).
21. In discussing the presence of insurance in the instant case, the court statedthat the law imposed no liability upon the insured parents for their negligence resultingin damages to their child, and that such post-contractual liability would not be created.
"We refuse to impose a liability where none existed when the contract of insurance
was issued." 390 Pa. 287, 300, 135 A.2d 65, 73 -(1957). Thus, if the court is everto change its position in this type of case, judgment would be against the insured,but the insurer would not be liable, because in any case reaching the court the insur-
ance will have been issued at a time when the parental immunity rule was operative.The court's apparent stand on the insurer's liability will militate heavily against the
use of insurance coverage as an important factor in discarding the doctrine in the
future.
22. Of course, it may be possible to get insurance with the consent of the insurer.But it would be of dubious value if the courts were to adhere to the parental immunity
rule and say that the insurer is only liable where the insured incurs legal liability.If the coverage were contracted for, it would still appear that the insurer's contractualliability would only arise upon existence of legal tort liability of the insured.
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a roomer in the Jenkins household. His family cooperated with reporters
and photographers and permitted a family photograph to be taken for use
in local newspapers. In January, 1954, the defendant published this photo-
graph in Front Page Detective, a crime magazine, and briefly documented
it with a factual summary of events.' The Jenkins family brought suit to
recover damages for this invasion of their private lives, alleging that de-
fendant's publication was neither privileged nor authorized.2  The district
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that publication of an intrinsically newsworthy
item was privileged, and that, as a matter of law, a jury should not be
permitted to find that the character of this magazine vitiated the privilege.
Three judges dissented, emphasizing plaintiffs' right to limit interference
with their privacy, and emphasizing Pennsylvania's recognition of this
right to privacy. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir.
1958) .8
Invasion of privacy is a relatively novel concept to the law of torts. In
some states, courts have decided that no such right of privacy exists; 4 in
other states, legislatures have provided for the right by statute.5 In the
remaining states where the question has been raised, there has been limited
recognition of the right, or, at least, a refusal to deny its existence., A few
early cases attempted to obviate a decision on the right of privacy by
finding liability for unauthorized publications through breach of an implied
contract,7 but the weight of authority has approached privacy law as a
development of the law of torts.8 The right of privacy has been uniformly
held to be subject to certain privileged interferences, principally, inter-
ferences by publicity in which the public has a general interest.9 The history
1. The defendant purchased the photograph from World Wide Photos, Inc., to
whom the Pittsburgh newspapers had sold it.
2. Paragraph four of the complaint states: "The defendant is sued for damaging
and injuring the plaintiffs by invading the privacy of the plaintiffs by publishing or
causing to be published and circulated a picture of the plaintiffs without their permis-
sion and without privilege as hereinafter set forth." The insufficiency of these allega-
tions was an alternative ground for the decision.
3. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958).
4. Henry v. Cherry and Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 Ati. 97 (1909) ; Milner v. Red River
Valley Publishing Co., 249 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Yoeckel v. Samonig,
272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
5. N. Y. Crv. RIGHTs LAW §§ 50, 51; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-7-76-4-9
(1953); VA. CoDE ANN. §8-650 (1950).
6. See PRossER, TORTS, 636-37 (2d ed. 1955).
7. McCreery v. Miller's Groceteria, 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1936) ; Douglas
v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912). Both cases give the plaintiff a property
interest in his personal photograph so that publication without consent produces a
cause of action in general assumpsit for breach of an implied contract to pay for an
interference with plaintiff's property right.
8. Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 231 P.2d 565 (1951) ; Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1904) ; Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 867
(1938).
9. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939)
Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1945) ; Themo v. New England News-
paper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940) ; Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre
Co., 1 Ohio Supp. 19 (1938). RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 867c (1938).
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of the right to privacy in Pennsylvania began with Waring v. WDAS
Broadcasting Co., "0 where Justice Maxey wrote a concurring opinion in
which he declared that Waring's privacy, and not his property, had been in-
vaded. The reasoning of this concurring opinion was particularly applied
in Mack's Appeal," a decision which the dissenting justices in the instant
case proclaim as firmly establishing the existence of this right in Pennsyl-
vania. 12 The Pennsylvania bar appears to agree with this interpretation.
18
The importance of the instant decision is the treatment of privileged inter-
ferences with privacy.. The opinion focuses attention on the character of
the item published, and urges that as soon as that character has been estab-
lished as newsworthy, the issue of privilege is affimatively resolved.1 4  The
court rejects the argument that the character of the medium can affect the
question of privilege,15 and strengthens the basic holding by deciding al-
ternatively, that even if the character of the medium could affect the
privilege, such a novel issue must be raised specially in the pleadings; and
failure to raise it was a fatal omission in plaintiffs' complaint.,, The court
then concludes that, as a matter of law, the item here is newsworthy and
the medium here is not of such a character as would affect its privileged
nature, even if that issue were specially raised.
It is difficult to see how the court can define news as the current
interest of all kinds of people in all kinds of events, 17 (a definition suggesting
the classic description of an issue which the jury should determine) and
then assert that newsworthiness is an issue which a jury need not decide.
It is equally difficult to see how the court can emphasize the newsworthy
character of an item to the exclusion of all factual inquiries into the char-
acter of the medium through which the item is published; for if the
privileged publication of newsworthy items is to have any limits at all,
these limits should be found in the manner in which the item is published.
10. 327 Pa. 433, 194 At. 631 (1937).
11. 386 Pa. 251, 259, 126 A.2d 679, 683 (1956).
12. Chief Judge Biggs, who wrote the dissenting opinion, stated: "In the Appeal
of Mack, . . . the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania made it clear that there is a right
to privacy in the law of Pennsylvania, and that the Courts of Pennsylvania should
protect it."
13. McClelland, The Right of Privacy in Pennsylvania, 28 Pa. B.A.Q. 279 (March
1957).
14. The court said: "Once the character of an item as news is established, it is
neither feasible nor desirable for a court to make a distinction between news for
information and news for entertainment in determining the extent to which publica-
tion is privileged." Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir.
1957).
15. The court very simply said: "For the purpose of the law of privacy we cannot
see how the character of an item can be affected by the journal in which it appears."
Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 452 (3d Cir. 1957).
16. "The mere charge here that the publication was unprivileged is in our view
wholly insufficient to put in issue such a special type of wrong as this." Jenkins v. Dell
Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 452 (3d Cir. 1957).
17. Id. at 451.
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Where unbridled curiosity 18 or extreme morbidity 19 is the appetite the
publication satisfies, there should be no privilege, because there is no social
benefit in the satisfaction of such appetites. Proof of these and similar
non-privileged publications can be made only by demonstrating the en-
vironment which the medium itself creates. Policywise, therefore, the court
has proffered an unfortunate rule of law; by precluding inquiry into the
character of the medium, it has, in effect, decided that the privilege to pub-
lish newsworthy items is without limitation.
John M. Regan.
18. Garner v. Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
19. Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
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